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Online Appendix
Dynamic Pricing and Replenishment with Customer Upgrades
Online Appendix:
Glossary of Terms: Below, we provide a list of the main notation (in a rough order of appearance) used for the
proof of the main results presented in the Appendix. For i, j = {1,2},
xti : inventory position of product type-i at the beginning of period t where product type-1
refers to the higher quality product and product type-2 refers to the lower quality product
wti : intermediate inventory position of product type-i in period t after demand realization
wt : total intermediate inventory in period t after demand realization, i.e., wt =wt1 +w
t
2
uti : ending inventory position for product type-i after upgrades
dti : mean demand for product type-i
yti : replenishment level for product type-i











2) with t periods remaining
Gt(wt1,w
t




2) with t periods remaining
V ti : partial derivative of V
t(·) with respect to its ith argument (similarly defined for Gt(·))
V tij : second partial derivative of V
t(·) with respect to its ith and jth arguments (similarly defined for Gt(·))
Ḡt(·) : second-stage profit as a function of the inventory position for product type-i after upgrades
Jt(·) : first stage profit as a function of the decision variables zti and dti
Jtdi : partial derivative of J
t(·) with respect to dti
Jtzi : partial derivative of J
t(·) with respect to zti
Jtdi,dj : second partial derivative of J
t(·) with respect to dti and dtj
Jtzi,zj : second partial derivative of J
t(·) with respect to zti and ztj
In order to derive the optimal policy structure, we first make an inductional assumption on the properties of the value
function V t(xt1, x
t
2). We will then show that these properties hold throughout the dynamic programming recursions.
In the following analysis, we assume that V t(xt1, x
t
2) is twice-continuously differentiable. As part of the inductional
step, assume that the value function in period t− 1, V t−1(xt−11 , x
t−1
2 ) satisfies the following properties:
Induction Assumption: V t−1(xt−11 , x
t−1


















for i, j = 1,2.
These properties enable us to derive the structure of the optimal upgrade policy in period t. After characterizing
the optimal upgrade policy, and later the optimal production and pricing policies, we will subsequently show in the
forthcoming Lemma 4 that these properties also hold for V t(xt1, x
t
2). Note that the induction assumption is trivially
satisfied for V 0(x01, x
0
2).
Proof of Theorem 1 (Optimal Upgrade Policy):
The optimal upgrade policy is determined by solving the second-stage problem described in (4), which we analyze
through a variable transformation. For any intermediate inventory position wt1 and w
t
2, with a total intermediate
1
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inventory position wt =wt1 +w
t
2, let Ḡ
t(ut1) be defined such that Ḡ
t(ut1) =−h1(ut1)−h2(wt−ut1)+βV t−1(ut1,wt−ut1)
where ut1 and w
t − ut1 represent, respectively, the period ending inventory positions for product type-1 and product
type-2 after upgrades. In particular, when ut units of upgrades are given, we have ut1 = w
t
1 − ut. Thus, the choice
of ut1 will immediately determine the upgrade quantity u
t. The constraint ut1 ≤wt1, i.e., ut ≥ 0, guarantees that the
upgrade quantity is nonnegative, implying unidirectional product substitutions for the demand for the lower quality
product by a higher quality product and not vice versa.
The first derivative of Ḡt(ut1) with respect to u
t
















where I(·) denotes the indicator function and V
t−1
1 (·, ·) denotes the partial derivative of V t−1(·, ·) with respect to
its first argument and V t−12 (·, ·) denotes the partial derivative of V t−1(·, ·) with respect to its second argument. For
expositional clarity, when a function’s arguments are evident, we suppress the notation and write for example, Ḡt, V t,
or V ti and V
t
ij for i, j = 1,2. The second derivative of Ḡ











By the induction assumption, V t−1 is concave, submodular and its Hessian has diagonal dominance property, i.e.,
V t−111 ≤ V
t−1




21 ≤ 0. Hence, Ḡt is concave in ut1 and its first derivative with respect to ut1 is
decreasing. Let rt(wt) be defined such that, if for given wt,
dḠt(ut1)
dut1
> 0 for all ut1, then r




≤ 0}. Then, given wt, rt(wt) is the optimal protection level for product type-1 and we can express
the optimal upgrade quantity, ut∗, through this protection level. Specifically, ut∗ = (wt1− rt(wt))+.
To show that rt(wt) is increasing with respect to wt, consider wt and wt such that wt >wt. We would like to show




= β(V t−112 −V
t−1




22 by the induction assumption, we have g(u
t
1,w
t)− g(ut1,wt)≥ 0. The
result then immediately follows from the definition of rt(wt) = min{ut1 |
dḠt(ut1)
dut1
≤ 0}. In order to show that rt(wt)−wt




the ending inventory for product type-2 after ut units of upgrades. Hence, wt−ut2 will denote the inventory level for
product type-1 after upgrades. We can then rewrite Ḡt(ut2) =−h1(wt−ut2)−h2(ut2) +βV t−1(wt−ut2, ut2). Define ut∗2
as the optimal inventory position for product type-2 after upgrades. Note that since the total inventory after upgrades
equals total inventory prior to upgrades, we have ut∗2 + u
t∗
1 = w
t. The first and second derivatives of Ḡt(ut2) with











t−ut2, ut2)+βV t−12 (wt−ut2, ut2)
and β(V t−111 − V
t−1




21 ), respectively. Due to the inductional assumption, Ḡ
t(ut2) is concave with
respect to ut2. Since the first derivative of Ḡ
t(ut2) is increasing with w
t, we find ut∗2 is increasing with w
t. This in turn
directly implies wt − ut∗1 is increasing in wt, or equivalently ut∗1 −wt is decreasing in wt. Note that when the first
derivative of Ḡt(ut2)< 0 for all u
t








1, i.e., no upgrades are given and, as before, the
protection threshold can be stated as rt(wt) =∞. Otherwise, when the first derivative of Ḡt(ut2)≥ 0, the protection
level rt(wt) equals ut∗1 . Therefore, u
t∗
1 −wt decreasing in wt implies rt(wt)−wt is decreasing in wt. 
Proof of Theorem 2 (Optimal Replenishment Policy):
The outline for the proof of Theorem 2 is as follows. We first present a reformulation of the first-stage problem
with change of variables that facilitate the subsequent analysis. We then derive several structural properties on the
first-stage profit function. Finally, we complete the characterization of the optimal replenishment policy structure.
In order to simplify the analysis, we define a new set of variables (zt1, z
t




i − dti for i= 1,2, where,
as a reminder to the reader, yti and d
t
i denote the replenish-up-to level and target mean demand for product type-i,
respectively. An economic interpretation of zti is that it represents the target safety-stock level for product type-i after
its current inventory position is augmented by the replenishment quantity and depleted by the expected demand for
Ceryan, Duenyas, Sahin: Dynamic Pricing and Replenishment with Customer Upgrades
; 3
the product. In addition, rather than the prices (pt1, p
t





to mean demands. This choice simplifies the exposition of our results. The prices of both products can then be






2), as the new decision variables,



















































2)− (c1(zt1 + dt1) + c2(zt2 + dt2)) + Eεt1,εt2 [(G
t(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)]. The






2) that will be utilized
















































2) and possesses the
following strict diagonal dominance property: Jtd1,d1 < J
t
d1,d2
≤ 0 and Jtd2,d2 < J
t
d2,d1
≤ 0; and (b) Jt(zt1, zt2, dt1, dt2)
is submodular in (zt1, z
t






















2). For part (a), first note that the inverse















(q̄ − q1)d1 + (q̄ − q2)d2
]






























2)− ct1dt1 − ct2dt2
)
for i= 1,2.
Written explicitly, we have
Jtd1 =


















Further, the Hessian is given by − 2
δ(q̄−q)
[
(q̄− q1)(q1− q) (q̄− q1)(q2− q)
(q̄− q1)(q2− q) (q̄− q2)(q2− q)
]








strictly concave and submodular in (dt1, d
t
2), and possesses strict diagonal dominance property.








2), it suffices to show that the properties hold for Eεt1,εt2 [(G
t(zt1−εt1, zt2−
εt2)]. In order to show the strict concavity and diagonal dominance, consider a momentary partitioning of the function









































































I(0>ut1−wt1>wt2) with I(·) denoting the indicator function. In words, we are
partitioning the expected profit-to-go function Eεt1,εt2 [(G
t(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)] into two components, where the first
component Eεt1,εt2 [H
t(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)] refers to the expected holding and shortage cost if no upgrades were given
and the second component Eεt1,εt2 [Ĝ
t(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)] is the result of the maximization problem when the optimal
upgrade quantity is selected, and reflects the discounted profit-to-go function for the next period as well as the
adjustment to the holding and shortage costs due to upgrades. One can straightforwardly show that the Hessian of
Eεt1,εt2 [H




i) for i= 1,2 and therefore is strictly
concave, submodular, and possesses the strict diagonal dominance property for positive unit holding and shortage
costs and continuously defined probability density functions fε1(·) and fε2(·) for the demand uncertainty terms εt1 and
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εt2. Next we show Eεt1,εt2 [Ĝ
t(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2)] is weakly concave, submodular and possesses a weak diagonal dominance




1)−µt1(ut1−wt1) for the second-stage optimization problem
given in (4) where µt1 ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrangian variable associated with constraint ut1−wt1 ≤ 0. For the case where






22 ≤ 0 for i, j = 1,2 where the inequality follows from the






ij for i, j = 1,2.
Based on the inductional assumption, we then have Ĝtii− Ĝtij ≤ 0 for i 6= j and i= 1,2. Hence, Ĝt(wt1,wt2) is concave,






2) is an addition of three terms
one of which, Eεt1,εt2 [H
t(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)], is strictly concave and submodular in (zt1, zt2) with a Hessian possessing
strict diagonal dominance, the other, Eεt1,εt2 [Ĝ
t(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2)], which is concave and submodular in (zt1, zt2) with a








2), itself is strictly concave
and submodular in (zt1, z
t
2) with a Hessian possessing strict diagonal dominance. 
To proceed with the characterization of the optimal policy, we first construct the first order conditions by introducing
Lagrange multipliers λtij ≥ 0 for i, j = {1,2} where λti1 and λti2 are associated with constraints −zti − dti ≤−xti and
zti +d
t
i ≤ xti+Ki, respectively (i.e., yti ≥ xti and yti ≤ xti+Ki in the original formulation before the change of variables).
We note that these constraints form ‘box constraints’ and some may not be simultaneously active for positive capacity
parameters. We can exploit this special structure of constraints to represent the first-order optimality conditions in
simpler notation by defining λti := λ
t
i1−λti2. Note that λti uniquely determines λtij for j = 1,2 where (a) λti < 0 implies
λti1 = 0 and λ
t
i2 > 0, (b) λ
t
i > 0 implies λ
t
i1 > 0 and λ
t
i2 = 0; and (c) λ
t


















































in terms of λt1 and λ
t
2. The following lemma formally presents this result.
Lemma 2. There exists implicit functions z′ti and d
′t












































| for i 6= j and i, j = 1,2.
Proof: The proof follows from the Implicit Function Theorem, the first order conditions and Lemma 1. We first present









and Jtz2 + λ
t









= −Jtz2,z1 , and
∂λt2
∂zt2















. Since Jt is strictly concave in (zt1, z
t













































| for i 6= j and i, j = 1,2.




2) follows similarly. From the first order conditions, we have J
t
d1
+ λt1 = 0 and J
t
d2




























Jt is strictly concave in (dt1, d
t



















2). Substituting in the terms for J
t
di,dj
































| for i 6= j and
i, j = 1,2 directly follow as q̄ > q1 > q2 > q.















= 0, (b) for all (xt1, x
t
2) such that λ
t







Proof: The signs of λt1 and λ
t
2 segment the state space into nine different regions depending on whether each variable
is negative, zero, or positive. For the region where λt1 = λ
t
2 = 0, we have
∂λti
∂xtj
= 0 for i, j = 1,2 and the result holds.
Consider the region for which λt1 > 0 and λ
t
2 = 0, implying that the constraint x
t
1−z′∗t1 (λt1,0)−d′∗t1 (λt1,0)≤ 0 is active.
Specifically, in this region we’d like to show that λt1 is strictly increasing in x
t
1 and independent of x
t
2. Differentiating






































Next, consider the region where λt1 > 0 and λ
t
2 < 0, which implies that the constraints x
t
1−z′∗t1 (λt1, λt2)−d′∗t1 (λt1, λt1)≤










1) − xt2 −K2 ≤ 0 are active. First, differentiating each of the active constraints with
respect to xt1 and solving for
∂λti
∂xt1






























































. The terms in each of the brackets


















> 0 by Lemma 2. Next, differentiating the
active constraints with respect to xt2 this time and solving for
∂λti
∂xt1






























for i 6= j and i, j = 1,2.
The analysis for the remaining cases are very similar to the ones considered and are omitted for brevity. 
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we examine each of the nine state-space regions defined by the signs of λt1








1 (0,0) + d
′∗t
1 (0,0)
and y∗t2 = z
′∗t
2 (0,0) + d
′∗t








1 (0,0) and x
◦
2
t := z′∗t2 (0,0)+d
′∗t
2 (0,0). Hence, anywhere in this region, the optimal replenishment policy
brings the inventory level to the base-stock levels given by y∗ti = x
◦
1
t and the base-stock levels for each product is
independent of the initial inventory level of the other product.
Next, consider the region for which λt1 > 0 and λ
t
2 = 0. Then, from complementary slackness, there is no replenishment












































Now, we consider the region for which λt1 < 0 and λ
t
2 = 0. From complementary slackness, the available capacity for
product type-1 is used in its entirety to replenish this item. The optimal base-stock level for item 2 is again given by








1,0). For the monotonicity of this base-stock level with respect to the initial







































In the region corresponding to λt1 = 0 and λ
t
2 > 0, complementary slackness yields no replenishment for item 2. The








2). In terms of the


































< 0. Therefore, in this region we also have y∗t1 < x
◦
1
t. In the region where λt1 > 0 and λ
t
2 > 0, no
replenishment takes place for either item. The analysis for the remaining four regions are similar. 
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Proof of Theorem 3 (Optimal Pricing Policy):
Solving for dt1 and d
t
2 in the first order conditions corresponding to the demand selection decisions, J
t
d1
+λt1 = 0 and
Jtd2 +λ
t
2 = 0, where J
t
d1
and Jtd2 are as given in (10), and substituting the inverse demand-price relationships derived
in the proof of Lemma 1, we get:
pt1 =


















First, consider the region for which λt1 = λ
t













, where both prices are independent of the starting inventory levels within the region. We











list price for product 1 and product 2, respectively.
Next, consider the region defined by λt1 > 0 and λ
t







and pt2 = p
0 t



















= 0 (where the inequality and the equality follow from Lemma 3), pt1 is






2 , we also have p
t




2. The case for
which λt1 < 0 and λ
t








2 with the same monotonicity properties
as in the previous case.
When λt1 = 0 and λ
t















2 . We also find






2 independent of x
t
1 and decreasing in x
t
2. Again, the case with λ
t
1 = 0 and λ
t
2 < 0






2 with the same monotonicity properties p
t





2 independent of x
t
1 and decreasing in x
t
2.
For λt1 > 0 and λ
t












. As both λt1 > 0 and λ
t





and pt2 < p
0 t










< 0 for i, j = {1,2}, i.e., both pt1 and pt2 are decreasing in xt1 and xt2. These monotonicity results also
similarly carry to all other cases where λt1 6= 0 and λt2 6= 0. 
Preservation of the Structural Properties of the Value Function:
To complete the analysis of the optimal policy characterization, lastly we show that the value function V t(xt1, x
t
2)
retains the properties of V t−1(xt−11 , x
t−1
2 ) that were assumed in the induction step as outlined in the Induction
Assumption.
Lemma 4 (Completing the Induction). V t(xt1, x
t
2) is jointly concave, submodular, and its Hessian possesses




2)≤ V t12(xt1, xt2)≤ 0 and V t22(xt1, xt2)≤ V t21(xt1, xt2)≤ 0.













for i, j = 1,2. By Lemma 3,
∂λti
∂xtj
≥ 0. Hence, V tij(xt1, xt2) ≤ 0 and therefore V t(xt1, xt2) is










≤ 0, where the inequality follows from
Lemma 3. V t(xt1, x
t






2)≤ 0 and V tii(xt1, xt2)−V tij(xt1, xt2)≤ 0. 
Proof of Theorem 4 (Impact of Upgrades on Pricing and Replenishment):
As we discuss in Section 5.1, our preceding analysis to characterize the structure of the optimal policy can straight-
forwardly be extended to incorporate an upgrade limit ūt in the second-stage upgrade problem. For brevity, we omit
the replication of the derivation but would like to highlight that the optimal upgrade policy can now be stated as
ut∗ = min((wt1− rt(wt))+, ūt), while the structure of the optimal pricing and replenishment policies continue to hold
as stated in Theorems 2 and 3. The first order conditions outlined in the proof of Theorem 2 for the modified problem
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where we incorporate an upgrade limit ūt can be written explicitly by substituting in the structure of the optimal
second-stage upgrade decision as stated below:
− ct1 + Eεt1,εt2 [
∂
∂zt1
Gt(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2)] +λt1 = 0
− ct2 + Eεt1,εt2 [
∂
∂zt2
Gt(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2)] +λt2 = 0





(q1− q)d1 + (q2− q)d2
]
− ct1 +λt1 = 0





(q̄− q1)d1 + (q̄− q2)d2
]
− ct2 +λt2 = 0
(12)
where Gt(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2) =
[−h1(zt1− εt1)−h2(zt2− εt2) +βV t−1(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2)] · I(zt1−εt1<rt(zt1+zt2−εt1−εt2))
+ [−h1(rt(zt1 + zt2− εt1− εt2))−h2(zt1 + zt2− εt1− εt2− rt(zt1 + zt2− εt1− εt2))
+βV t−1(rt(zt1 + z
t
2− εt1− εt2), zt1 + zt2− εt1− εt2− rt(zt1 + zt2− εt1− εt2))] · I(zt1−εt1−ūt<rt(zt1+zt2−εt1−εt2)<zt1−εt1)
+ [−h1(zt1− εt1− ūt)−h2(zt2− εt2 + ū) +βV t−1(zt1− εt1− ūt, zt2− εt2 + ūt)] · I(rt(zt1+zt2−εt1−εt2)<zt1−εt1−ūt)
and I(·) is the indicator function.
Consider first the case for which λt1 = λ
t











































and using the concavity, submodularity and diagonal dominance properties of V t−1, we find
∂zt1
∂ūt













































i, we also have
∂yt1
∂ūt





For the case where λt1 > 0 and λ
t




1. Differentiating the expres-




1 with respect to ū






















(Ṽ t11Ṽ t22−Ṽ t12Ṽ t21)−2Ṽ t22
< 0 where Ṽ tij stands for Eεt1,εt2
[
V t−1ij (·, ·) · I(rt(·)<zt1−εt1−ū) + 0 · I(rt(·)>zt1−εt1−ū)
]
.
The inequality follows due to δ(q̄−q2)
(q̄−q1)(q1−q2)

























































Next, consider the case for which λt1 > 0 and λ
t



















2 with respect to ū
















< 0. The analysis for the remaining cases are
similar and hence omitted for brevity. 
Proof of Theorem 5 (Sensitivity to Quality Differential):
















2(q̄−q) > 0 and
∂p0 t2
∂q1
= 0, i.e. an increase
in the quality level of the higher quality product results in an increase in the list price of the higher quality product
but does not impact the optimal list price charged for the lower quality product. Similarly, with respect to an increase
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Regarding the monotonicities of the base-stock levels, we first need to consider the monotonicities of the mean demand
selections, d∗t1 and d
∗t




2 in the first order conditions corresponding to the
demand selection decisions, Jtd1 +λ
t
1 = 0 and J
t
d2
+λt2 = 0, where J
t
d1
and Jtd2 are as given in (10), and recalling that
in this region, we have λt1 = 0 and λ
t
























). We first consider













)> 0 where the inequality
follows since ct1 > c
t
2 and p̄ > c
t














)< 0. Thus, an increase in the
quality level of the higher quality product leads the firm to select a higher mean demand value for the higher quality
product and a lower mean demand value for the lower quality product. Now, considering the first order conditions
with respect to zt1 and z
t
2, i.e., −ct1 + Eεt1,εt2 [
∂
∂zt1
Gt(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)] = 0 and −ct2 + Eεt1,εt2 [
∂
∂zt2
Gt(zt1 − εt1, zt2 − εt2)] = 0












= 0. Thus, the expected number of customers























< 0. Lastly, we consider



















(ct1− ct2) + ct2. 
Proof of Theorem 6 (Sensitivity to Cost Parameters):
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. Recall that our focus is limited to the region corresponding to λt1 =
λt2 = 0. Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to c
t







































































11]−E[Gt12]E[Gt21]> 0) , hence

































= 0, thus in this region, the list price of product type-1 increases while the list price for






























, i.e., the decrease in the expected protection level is accompanied by an even greater decrease in the
expected intermediate inventory level of product type-1. Therefore, again by Theorem 1, the expected number of
subsequent upgrades decreases. The analysis for the sensitivity with respect to ct2 is similar.











> 0, thus the list price for both products increase. Note that since γ > 1, the increase in the
list price for product type-1 is larger than that for product type-2. Next, differentiation of the first order conditions
































































































































< 0 if γ < γtr, and
∂y∗t2
∂ct






< 0, thus the expected protection level decreases. Introduce and let γtu :=
G̃11
G̃12









< 0, i.e., the decrease in the expected protection level is accompanied by an even greater decrease in
the expected intermediate inventory level of product type-1, and thus the expected number of subsequent upgrades
decreases by Theorem 1. 


























































































Figure 3 Price of Product 1 (top) and Price of Product 2 (bottom) in period 5 across perfectly positively
correlated demand (left), independent demand (center), and perfectly negatively correlated demand
(right)
Supplement to Numerical Study (Section 6):
Section 6.2 Impact of Demand Correlation: As described in the main text, our numerical studies indicate that the
optimal policy structure in the presence of demand correlation is similar to the optimal policy structure shown for
the independent demand setting. As an example, Figure 3 displays the similarity in the pricing policy for the higher
and lower quality products in period 5 for different correlations, namely, perfectly positively correlated demand,
independent demand, and perfectly positively correlated demand.
Section 6.3 A Heuristic Policy: We provide below the explicit representation of the single-period reduced problem
in which the firm with no capacity restrictions and no initial inventory determines optimal base-stock levels for the
two products.ŷ◦1 and ŷ
◦




2 taking into account possible upgrades. The single-period
expected cost function C(y1, y2) consists of replenishment costs ci per unit of product type-i, holding and shortage
costs h+i and h
−
i after demand realization and any subsequent upgrades, and a discounted cost βci for any negative
inventory (imitating the replacement cost to return to the original zero inventory position) or a reward −βci for any
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with S1 = {(ε1, ε2) : ε1 ≤ y1 − d◦1 and ε2 ≤ y2 − d◦2}, S2 = {(ε1, ε2) : ε1 ≥ y1 − d◦1 and ε2 ≤ y2 − d◦2}, S3 = {(ε1, ε2) : ε1 ≥
y1 − d◦1 and ε2 ≥ y2 − d◦2}, S4 = {(ε1, ε2) : ε1 ≤ y1 − d◦1 and y2 − d◦2 ≤ ε2 ≤ y1 + y2 − d◦1 − d◦2 − ε1}, and S5 = {(ε1, ε2) :
ε1 ≤ y1− d◦1 and ε2 ≥ y1 + y2− d◦1 − d◦2 − ε1}.
In words, S1, S2, and S3 correspond to, respectively, demand uncertainty realizations that result in excess inventory
in both products, a shortage of the higher quality product and excess in the lower quality product, and shortages
in both types of products. Collectively, these three areas do not lead to upgrades. The next two areas, S4 and S5,
correspond to uncertainty realizations where there is excess in the higher quality product and a shortage in the lower
quality product, where in the former all demand for the lower quality product is upgraded, and in the latter, the
upgrade quantity is limited by the availability of the higher quality product.








2 ≥ β(c1− c2),
and the optimal base-stock levels for this reduced problem, denoted by ŷ◦1 and ŷ
◦
2 , simultaneously satisfy the following








































Proof of Theorem 7 (Optimal Upgrade Fee):
As in the proof of the earlier main results, we start with the inductional assumption that the value function in period
t− 1, V t−1(xt−11 , x
t−1
2 ) is jointly concave, submodular, and its Hessian possesses the diagonally dominance property.
The preservation of these properties will however require a new additional condition that we will establish within the
subsequent proof of Theorem 8.









































































1−ut− ζt,wt2 +ut + ζt) +V t−12 (w
t
1−ut− ζt,wt2 +ut + ζt)
] (16)
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where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function for ζt and and V t−1j (·, ·) denotes the partial derivative of V
t−1(·, ·)
with respect to its jth argument. (Note: The assumption that f(·) has zero density at the boundaries −ut and Dt2−ut
is utilized in the derivation of the above expression, and together with the vanishing variance at ut = 0 or ut =Dt2,
also guarantees continuity of the objective function at the boundaries.) As before, for expositional clarity, when a
function’s arguments are evident, we suppress the notation and write for example, Ḡt, V t, or V ti and V
t
































where the strict inequality follows as the first three terms are strictly negative and the remaining term is nonpositive
due to the inductional assumptions of submodularity and diagonal dominance for V t−1(xt−11 , x
t−1
2 ). Thus, Ḡ
t is
strictly concave in ut. Let µt1 ≥ 0 and µt2 ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian variables associated with the constraints ut ≥ 0 and
ut ≤Dt2, respectively. Note that since we assume Dt2 > 0, µt1 and µt2 cannot be simultaneously nonzero. Thus we need
to consider three cases.
First, consider the case µt∗1 = 0 and µ
t∗
2 = 0. Then, the optimal u
t∗ is the solution to ∂Ḡ
t
∂ut
= 0. To show how ut∗
changes with wt1, we differentiate the first order condition with respect to w
t
















































] . As both
the numerator and denominator are negative due to the inductional assumptions, we have ∂u
t∗
∂wt1
> 0. Therefore, the







< 0. Thus, the optimal
upgrade fee pt∗u is decreasing in w
t













































] < 0 where
the inequality follows as the numerator is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly neg-







> 0. Hence, the
optimal upgrade fee pt∗u is increasing in w
t





































> 0. Thus, the upgrade fee is increasing with the demand pool Dt2.
Note that when the firms decides to upgrade ut∗ customers, it is in effect, also selecting a target protection level
wt1−ut∗ on the higher level product. We also provide several monotonicty results on this protection level. Following
the above analysis, one can also straightforwardly establish that (a) ∂u
t∗
∂wt1






< 1. Through (a),




we see that the protection level wt1 − ut∗ is also increasing in wt2, and through (b) we find that the increase in the
protection level with respect to wt1 is stronger than the increase in the protection level with respect to w
t
2. Thus, the
protection level is a function of wt1 and w
t





Finally, consider the case where µt∗1 > 0 and µ
t∗
2 = 0. This indicates that the constraint u
t ≥ 0 is active and we
immediately have pt∗u (u
t∗







) = p̄u. Similarly, the case for which µ
t∗
1 = 0 and µ
t∗
2 > 0 implies









) = p̄u. 
Supplement to Pricing and Replenishment with Upgrade Fees: As a supplement to the manuscript, the
below results summarize our findings regarding the optimal replenishment and pricing decisions when the firm selects
and charges an upgrade fee.





(x1o t, x2o t)
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Figure 4 Optimal pricing policy structure for the higher quality product (left) and the lower quality product
(right) when the firm sets upgrade fees
Theorem 8. (a) The optimal replenishment for both products follow the partially decoupled state-dependent base-









t = y∗t2 (x
◦
1




t denote list prices in period t for products type-1 and type-2, respectively. The optimal price for
the higher quality product type-1 follows the structure of the pricing policy described in Theorem 3.
For the lower quality product type-2, it is optimal to apply its list price p◦2
t if y∗t1 (x
t
2) − Kt1 ≤ xt1 ≤ y∗t1 (xt2) and
y∗t2 (x
t
1)−Kt2 ≤ xt2 ≤ y∗t2 (xt1). A price discount is given if xt1 ≥ y∗t1 (xt2)−Kt1 and xt2 ≥ y∗t2 (xt1), and a price surcharge is
given if xt1 ≤ y∗t1 (xt2) and xt2 ≤ y∗t2 (xt1)−Kt2. When y∗t2 (xt1)−Kt2 ≤ xt2 ≤ y∗t2 (xt1), either the list price or a price discount
may be optimal if xt1 ≥ y∗t1 (xt2), and either the list price or a price surcharge may be optimal if xt1 ≤ y∗t1 (xt2)−Kt1.




2)−K1 and xt2 > y∗t2 (xt1), or xt1 > y∗t1 (xt2) and xt2 <
y∗t2 (x
t
1)−K2, a price discount or a price surcharge may be optimal for product type-2.
Furthermore, the price of either product is decreasing with respect to the inventory level of either product.
Proof of Theorem 8 (Pricing and Replenishment with Upgrade Fees):
As the proof methodology is similar to the proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, for brevity, we only highlight the
main arguments here and refer to earlier results where applicable. We start by introducing several properties of the
second stage profit-to-go function, Gt.



















2)≤Gt21(wt1,wt2,Dt2)≤ 0, and (iii) Gt33(wt1,wt2,Dt2)≤ 0.
Proof: For brevity, we only present the proof for property (iii). The properties (i) and (ii) are derived in a similar







t)− µt2(ut −Dt2), where, as before, µt1 ≥ 0 and µt2 ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian
variables associated with the constraints ut ≥ 0 and ut ≤Dt2, respectively. We first consider the case corresponding to
µt∗1 = 0 and µ
t∗


















< 0 established in the proof of Theorem 7. Next, consider the case where µt∗1 > 0 and µ
t∗
2 = 0
corresponding to ut∗ = 0 due to the active constraint. Through the envelope theorem, we have Gt33 = 0. Similarly,
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the case µt∗1 = 0 and µ
t∗
2 > 0 corresponding to u










22 )≤ 0 due to the
inductional assumption.




















































2)− (c1(zt1 + dt1) + c2(zt2 + dt2)) + Eεt1,εt2 [(G
t(zt1− εt1, zt2− εt2, dt2 + εt2)].




























2) and similar argu-
ments as those presented in the proof of Lemma 1 verify its strict concavity.) For example, we now have Jtd2,d1 =
− 2(q2−q)(q̄−q1)




δ(q̄−q) + Eεt1,εt2 [G33], which yields J
t
d2,d2
− Jtd2,d1 = −
2(q2−q)(q1−q2)
δ(q̄−q) +
Eεt1,εt2 [G33]< 0 as the first term is strictly negative and G33 ≤ 0. Hence Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and the remaining argu-
ments in the proof of Theorem 2 also follow, resulting in the optimality of the partially decoupled state-dependent
base-stock policy.








−ct2 +Eεt1,εt2 [G3(·)] now includes the term Eεt1,εt2 [G3(·)], the derivation
of the list prices through solving Jtd1 = 0 and J
t
d2
= 0 no longer leads to a closed form solution of the problem
parameters. As the optimal pricing policy for the higher quality product otherwise follows an identical structure to
the one we derived for the original problem, for brevity, we limit our attention to only the pricing policy for the lower
quality product and to the regions where its structure deviates from the optimal policy for the original problem.
Specifically, consider the region where λt∗1 > 0 and λ
t∗















Eεt1,εt2 [G33]≤ 0. Thus, p
t∗

















= 0 by Lemma 3, establishing the monotonicity of pt∗2 in this region. For the region with λ
t∗
1 < 0
and λt∗1 > 0, a similar analysis shows that p
t∗
2 may be greater than or smaller than p
0 t
2 , and that p
t∗
2 is decreasing
with xt1 and x
t
2. 
